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United States, as the

United States Element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede,
86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979).
Hans Detlef Alexander Tiede and Ingrid Ruske were charged by
American officials in West Berlin with hijacking a Polish jet airliner
and related crimes.' The informations alleged that the defendants,
both residents of East Berlin, German Democratic Republic (East
Germany),2 boarded the plane in Gdansk, Poland. When the plane
was within minutes of its scheduled landing at Schoenfeld Airport,
East Germany, Tiede grabbed a stewardess, placed a gun to the back
of her head,* and demanded that the pilot land at Tempelhof Central
Airport located in the American sector of West Berlin." The captain,
apprehensive for the safety of his passengers and crew, complied with
the ultimatum. 6
United States authorities assumed jurisdiction over the defendants and convened the United States Court for Berlin.7 The court is
an outgrowth of the American occupation of Germany after World
War II and it shares concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the Berlin
courts within the American sector of West Berlin.' The proceedings
were governed by American procedural law and German substantive
law. 9

During the pre-trial proceedings, defense counsel filed motions
demanding a trial by jury." In opposition to the motions, the prosTrial Transcript at 2673-75, United States, as the United States Element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979) [hereinafter Trial Transcript].
In addition to the hijacking charge, both defendants were charged with the joint commission of
taking of a hostage and with depriving persons of their liberty in violation of the
Strafgesetzbuch, the German Criminal Code. Tiede was also charged with assault and unlawful
possession of a weapon. Informations, Criminal Case Nos. 78-001 & 78-001-A (U.S. Ct. for
Berlin Jan. 15, 1979).
Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 2257, 2276.
Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 2675.
4 Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 2676. The gun, a teargas and blank pistol, had been
smuggled on board by Ruske's twelve year-old daughter. Id. at 2675.
Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 1766-69, 2676.
6 Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 1768-70, 2684, 2774.
United States, as the United States Element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227, 228 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979). See note 82 infra.
' United States, as the United States Element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227, 238 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979).
Id. at 229.
Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript at 1236, United States, as the United States Element,
Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979) [hereinafter
Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript].
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ecution contended that the proceedings should not be governed by
the United States Constitution but instead by foreign policy as interpreted by the United States Secretary of State." The Secretary had
previously determined that the defendants were not entitled to a jury
trial.'
In United States, as the United States Element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede,"3 Judge Herbert J. Stern14 determined
that the accused were clothed with a constitutional right to trial by
jury and the motions were granted.13
Throughout the last century American courts have often considered the applicability of the United States Constitution to those territories outside the United States governed by American officials. The
issue was first addressed by the United States Supreme Court in In
re Ross. 6 In 1880, Ross, an American seaman, was convicted by an
American Consular tribunal for the murder of a fellow sailor on board
a United States vessel in the harbor of Yokohama, Japan."7 Ross petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ' asserting that the legislation,
promulgated pursuant to a series of American-Japanese treaties, 9
which provided for trials by consular tribunals 20 was
unconstitutional. 2' In particular, Ross claimed that he was unconsti-

" United States, as the United States Element, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede, 86
F.R.D. 227, 228 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979).

12Id.
86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979).
" Judge Stern, an article III judge in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, was appointed by the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany to preside over these proceedings in the capacity of an article II judge. Id. at 228. For a
further discussion of the jurisdictional issue, see note 82 infra.
Is 86 F.R.D. at 228. After the court suppressed certain statements made by Ruske, the
prosecutor moved for dismissal of all charges against her. Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript,
supra note 10, at 1236, 1239. The court found that Ruske had been "without bail, without an
attorney, without counsel of any kind, with mail censored, from August 30th to November 3rd,
[1978]," id. at 1222, in "violation of [her] Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." Id. at
1220. Judge Stern granted the requested relief. Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 1405-06. For a
discussion of the constitutional protections afforded by the United States Court for Berlin, see
note 81 infra.
'6 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
'I ld. at 457.
IS Id. at 454. The United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of New York denied
the petition and an appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 459.
1"Id. at 465. The terms of the treaty provided that "Americans committing offenses in Japan
shall be tried by the American consul general or consul, and shall be punished according to
American laws." Id. at 465.
iId. at 468-69. Enabling legislation was passed which provided that American ministers
and consul would have judicial authority to arraign, try, and sentence American citizens charged
with committing offenses against Japan "in conformity with the laws of the United States." Id.
1 Id. at 463. Ross reasoned that the legislation involved did not afford one accused of a
felony abroad the same protections enjoyed by American citizens at home. Id.
13
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tutionally deprived of his rights to indictment by grand jury and trial
by jury.22 Justice Field, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared
that the guarantees of the United States Constitution "apply only to
citizens and others within the United States, or [to those] who are
brought there for trial for alleged offenses committed elsewhere, and
not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad." z3
In the Insular Cases,2" the Court was called upon to interpret
the question whether constitutional protections extended beyond the
territorial United States. The Insular Cases is a series of Supreme
Court decisions which considered the issue of the permissibility of
the levy of import duties on goods entering the United States from
Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Phillippines.25 In Downes v. Bidwell 2 6
the issue raised was whether "Puerto Rico" was a territory of the
United States for the purposes of article I, section 8, clause I of the
United States Constitution which requires that "duties . . . be uniform 'throughout the United States.' "27 It was determined that "Porto
Rico" was merely "appurtenant . . . [to] but not a part of the United
States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution." z8 As a result,
the legislation which imposed non-uniform duties upon imports from
the island was not unconstitutional. 2 The Court concluded that Congress should approach the status of each territory on a case-by-case
basis. 3°

Id. at 458.
Id. at 464.
' Those opinions which constitute the Insular Cases are Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huss v. New York &
Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
' See King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1143 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
- 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
27 Id. at 277 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). The Court noted that while the inhabitants of a domestic territory "are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty and property," the Constitution does not expressly limit the powers of
Congress to regulate territories. 182 U.S. at 283, 285. The Court, however, declined to hold
that congressional power is unrestrained in this area. Id. at 283.
" 182 U.S. at 287. In contrast, the Court in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), the first
case in the Insular series, concluded that "Porto Rico was not a foreign country" for tariff law
purposes. It was held that duties exacted upon merchandise imported from Puerto Rico were
illegal. Id. at 200.
2 182 U.S. at 200.
1 Id. at 286. See also Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 151 (1901). Justice Harlan, in a
separate dissenting opinion, argued that despite the Court's holding in De Lima that Porto Rico
was a domestic territory rather than a foreign country, the plurality's opinion in Downes
approved of congressional discretion which would effectively "exclude the Constitution from a
domestic territory." 182 U.S. at 386 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2
2
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The Court in Hawaii v. Mankichi 3" addressed the issue of
whether, in the interim between the annexation of a territory and its
formal incorporation as part of the United States, Congress, by resolving to continue the existing territorial municipal legislation which
was not contrary to the United States Constitution, intended "to abolish at once" a criminal justice system which was incompatible with
the fifth and sixth amendments.3" Under that system, Mankichi was
convicted of manslaughter without the benefit of indictment by grand
jury and a unanimous twelve man jury.- The Court found such a
Congressional intent permissible if it was for the purpose of maintaining "the peace and good order of the community.""
Although it
found that any newly enacted legislation must be in conformity with
the United States Constitution, the Court determined "that it could
not have been within the contemplation of Congress" to give immediate effect to the requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments withIn
out providing for the implementation of a new judicial system.'
any event, the Court concluded that the rights to an indictment by
grand jury and a trial by jury were not fundamental.6 Therefore, the
criminal procedure under which Mankichi was convicted was
constitutional. 37 Thus, only fundamental rights applied to unincorporated territories. Justice Harlan, in a separate dissent, argued that
any territory over which the United States is sovereign is entitled to
be protected by the full ambits of the Constitution.3" The Justice
stated that regardless of "what the apparent necessities of the hour"
appeared to be, "the Constitution is the supreme law in every
territory." 39
In Dorr v. United States,40 an action for criminal libel which took
place in the unincorporated territory of the Philippine Islands, the
Court denied the defendant's demand for a jury trial.'
The issue
31 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
2 Id. at 209-11, 214-15.
31 Id. at 198.

Id. at 215-17.
a Id. at 215-16.
3 Id. at 217-18. As a foundation for this conclusion the Court noted:
31

that most, if hot all, the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of rights of
the Constitution were intended to apply from the moment of annexation; but . . .
the two rights alleged to be violated in this case are not fundamental in their nature.
Id.
, See id. at 217-18.
' Id. at 236-41 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 240, 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
,o 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
41 Id. at 139, 149.
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raised was whether, in the absence of a congressional statute, trial by
jury must be afforded to an accused tried in the Philippines. 2 The
Court concluded that unless a particular territory was incorporated
into the United States, Congress may enact laws governing the acquisition "subject to such constitutional restrictions upon the powers
of that body as are applicable to the situation."4a The majority expressed concern that if the United States was mandated to afford to
an accused a trial by jury wherever it asserted jurisdiction, regardless
of the capabilities of the native inhabitants, an injustice could
result." Unless and until Congress incorporated a territory into the
United States, the requirements of a jury trial could "provoke disturbance rather than . . . aid in the orderly administration of
justice." ' 45 The Court held that the Constitution "of its own force"
requires that Congress extend only fundamental rights to an unincorporated territory.4 The right to trial by jury, a non-fundamental
right, did not have to be included in the unincorporated territory's
criminal justice system. 47 In Balzac v. Porto Rico,' the Court reiterated that since "Porto Rico" was not a formally incorporated territory
of the United States, the sixth amendment right to trial by jury was
not binding upon the Puerto Rican legislature. 9
The application of the Constitution to foreign lands under American occupation became an issue once again as a consequence of the
cessation of hostilities after World War II. In 1957, in Reid v.
Covert,' the Supreme Court declared that in capital cases, United
States citizens who were accompanying members of the United States
5
armed forces overseas could not be tried by military court martial 1
but must be held to answer on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury and afforded the right to a trial by jury."2 The plurality
Id. at 139.
Id. at 143.
4 Id. at 148.
4.
4

Id.
Id. at 146-49.
Id. at 147-49.
I7
" 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
19Id. at 304-09.
-o 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
5' Justice Black, writing for the plurality, took the view that civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas could not be court martialed "for their offenses." Id. at 40-41.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in separate concurring opinions, found that only capital
offenses were exempt from military jurisdiction. Id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at
65 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, the Court's holding was restricted to capital offenses.
52 Id. at 5. The war powers possessed by Congress and the Executive under the United
States Constitution's article I, § 8, clause II and article III, § 2, clause I were held not to allow
"military trial of civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas ... where no actual hostili41

814
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opinion stated, without reservation, that when the United States acts
against its own citizens abroad it cannot do so outside the purview of
the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.' In implicitly overruling In
re Ross,m which held that the Constitution had no effect outside of
the United States, the Reid decision stated that Ross "should be left
as a relic from a different era." '
The Court also found the Insular
Cases to be of no precedential value. 57 Those cases were distinguished as dealing with territorial administration, often "with wholly
dissimilar traditions and institutions," 5'while Reid concerned the
constitutional rights of United States citizens abroad.59
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, observed that the importance of In re Ross and the Insular Cases could not be
overlooked.60 Citing Balzac v. Porto Rico as an example, Justice
Harlan concluded "that there is no rigid rule that [a] jury trial must
always be provided . .. if the circumstances are such that trial by
jury would be impractical and anomalous."61 "[W]hat Ross and the
Insular Cases [held] is that the particular local setting, the practical
ties [were] under way." Id. at 34-35. Conceding that military courts have improved in terms of
the addition of more procedural rights, the Court pointed out that "[1looming far above all other
deficiencies . .. is the absence of trial by jury before an independent judge." Id. at 37.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, considered the issue to be "which guarantees
of the Constitution should apply in view of the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives." Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
"3 Id. at 5-6. Mr. Justice Black expressed the plurality's opinion in these
terms:
When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield
which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his
life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land.
Id. at 6. Noting that the Court in Dorr suggested that only fundamental rights apply abroad,
Justice Black found it "anomalous to say that" a trial by jury is not a fundamental right. Id. at
8-9.
Justice Black noted that the United States had entered into executive agreements with
Great Britain and Japan. Id. at 15 & n.9, 16 & n.30. The countries stipulated that any offenses
committed in Japan or in Great Britain by United States military servicemen or their dependents would be tried by court martial. Id. at 15. Justice Black rejected the notion that an
executive agreement could emancipate a branch of the government from acting within the confines of the Constitution. Id. at 16. The Reid Court noted that pursuant to the supremacy clause
of the Constitution the United States is not permitted to enter "international agreement[s]
without observing constitutional prohibitions." Id. at 17.
- Id. at 10-13.
s 140 U.S. at 464. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
354 U.S. at 12. The Court noted that*Ross "[has] long since been directly repudiated by
numerous cases." Id.
17Id. at 14.

Id.
Id. See notes 24-49 supra and accompanying text.
354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61Id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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necessities, and the possible alternatives are relevant to . . . whether
[a] jury trial should be deemed . . . necessary."62
The Court in Kinsella v. Singleton", extended Reid to apply to
civilian dependents charged with noncapital offenses."' The Court
based its holding "on the 'status' of the accused, rather than on the
nature of the offense" as determinative of military jurisdiction. '
Several lower federal courts have also been confronted with the
question of the Constitution's applicability overseas. The results have
not always been congruous. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held, on two separate occasions," that military
dependents who are United States citizens residing in the Ryukyu
Islands (Okinawa) were entitled to indictment by grand jury and trial
by jury in conformity with article III and the fifth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution."
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, in Williamson v. Alldridge,- held that a United
States serviceman charged with a non-service connected offense need
not be afforded the rights of indictment by grand jury and trial by
jury.' The court, relying upon the then repudiated decision in In re
Ross, incorrectly reasoned that "[t]he United States Constitution
[was] not present in Okinawa."'I
62 Id. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
63

361 U.S. 234 (1960).

Id. at 248-49. To permit the prosecution of noncapital crimes by military tribunals could
lead to a situation in which military authorities downgrade what would otherwise be a capital
offense to nullify the Reid mandate. Id. at 244-45.
1 Id. at 243. Justice Clark cited as support Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 361 U.S. at
239. Toth involved the court martial of a discharged soldier for a crime committed while still in
military service. Id. The Court held that the necessary and proper clause was an insufficient
foundation to sustain an expansion of courts martial jurisdiction to persons who were not members of the armed forces. Id. at 239-40. Justice Clark viewed military jurisdiction as one which
should be narrowly drawn so as to ensure "'discipline among troops in active service."' Id.
(quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955)). Cf Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp.
840 (W. D. Okla. 1970) (serviceman charged with non-service related offense not entitled to jury
trial). See also Relford v. United States Disciplinary Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
" Nicholson v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 141-61 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 15, 1963)
[hereinafter Nicholson, No. 141-61]; Ikeda v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 416-62 (D.D.C.,
filed Oct. 19, 1962) [hereinafter Ikeda, No. 416-62.].
67 Nicholson, No. 141-61 at 4; Ikeda, No. 416-62 at 4.
320 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
6 Id. At 841, 843.
0 See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
7' 320 F. Supp. at 842-43. Insofar as the United States Constitution was not binding upon
American officials in Okinawa, the court stated that any constitutional rights afforded to those
prosecuted by the United States would be "only [those] rights existing at the pleasure of the
President." Id. at 843.
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More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in King v. Morton 2 considered the question
whether an American citizen charged with a crime in American
Samoa, an unincorporated territory of the United States, was entitled
to a jury trial.7 3 Citing the Insular Cases, Mankichi, 'Dorrand Balzac
as standing for the proposition "that only 'fundamental' constitutional rights apply to unincorporated territories such as American Samoa," the defendant contended that since the Supreme Court
in Duncan v. Louisiana and Baldwin v. New York had held the right
to trial by jury to be fundamental, the right should apply to American
Samoa.
Addressing this contention, the court noted that the cases
cited by the defendant held that the right to trial by jury, which was
not a fundamental right at that point in time, did not apply to unincorporated territories. 5 The court concluded that these cases were
not overruled by the Duncan and Baldwin decisions which dealt with
the application of that right in the United States, not in unincorporated territories.-, Concluding that the resolution of the issue did not
turn on key phrases "such as 'fundamental [rights]' or 'unincorporated
territory,' " the circuit court stated that "the present case . ..can be
reached only by applying the principles of the earlier cases, as controlled by their respective contexts, to the situation as it exists in
American Samoa today."-, The case was remanded to the lower
court for a determination of whether a Samoan jury could render a
just verdict "without being unduly influenced by (Samoan] customs
and traditions of which the criminal law takes no notice." 7 1 On remand, the district court concluded that a jury trial must be afforded. 9
The court in United States, as the United States Element, Allied
Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiedej" viewed the question presented to
be a narrow one: "whether friendly aliens, charged with [nonM

72 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

' Id. at 1142. King was tried and convicted of violating the income tax laws of American
Samoa. Id. A pre-trial motion for trial by jury was denied by the Trial Division of the High
Court of American Samoa, id., a Samoan Court formed under the auspices of the United States
Secretary of Interior. See id. at 1142-44. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the circuit court, noting probable jurisdiction, id. at 1148, advised the
district court on remand to decide the constitutional question subsequent to a reevaluation of
the jurisdictional question. Id. at 1146.
ild. at 1146-47.
Id. at 1147.

Id.
77 Id.
76

78 Id.

King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1977).
86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979).
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military] offenses in a United States court in Berlin, under the
unique circumstances of the continuing . . . occupation of Berlin,
have a right to a jury trial."', In an opinion written by Judge Stem, the
court first embarked on "an extensive account and analysis of the history of the occupation of Berlin [and] the jurisdictional basis of [the]
Court." 8" In light of this historical backdrop, Judge Stern took judis'Id. at 244. The court noted that rules governing the United States Court for Berlin were
"adopted almost verbatim [from] the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence; the exception related to jury trials." Id. at 238.
" Id. at 228. In describing the occupation of Germany and Berlin by Allied Forces, the
court evaluated the occupation to be one which had undergone substantial transition. Id. at
229-35. Immediately following the defeat of Germany in June, 1945, the Allies were responsible
for all functions of government at the various local, municipal, and state levels. Id. at 229-30.
Beginning in 1949, despite Soviet Union activities which were obstructive to the everyday
operation of Allied Government, France, Great Britain, and the United States (the Western
Allies) gradually abdicated their governmental authority to the German people. Id. at 231.
During this period, Western Allied military government terminated and was replaced by a
civilian Allied administration. Id. Allied civilian governmental functions in the American zones
of responsibility then became subject to the direction of the United States Department of State
rather than the Defense Department. Id. In 1955 the "Federal Republic [of Germany] assumed
full sovereign control over it9 territory." Id. at 232. However, the occupation of Berlin continued. Id. Local authorities in the Western sectors of Berlin were authorized "to exercise all
rights, powers and responsibilities. . subject to certain reservations." Id. at 234. Those reservations included "the right [of the Western Allies] to assume full authority over Berlin where
,essential to security or to preserve democratic government, or in the pursuance of the international obligations of their governments,' " and " 'the right to intervene, in an emergency, and
issue orders to ensure the security, good order and financial and economic stability of the City.' "
Id. at 233-34 (quoting Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea (Yalta) Conference, Feb. 11, 1945,
reprinted in COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1971 (Comm. Print 1971)).
The jurisdictional basis and source of power of the United States Court for Berlin is an
intricate and interesting area which would furnish an ample body of material for a separate
casenote. See 86 F.R.D. at 235-44, 253-56 for the court's analysis of the jurisdiction of the
United States Court for Berlin and the scope of its judicial review. For purposes of this note,
which addresses the narrow issue of the right to trial by jury, the following summary must be
sufficient.
This occupation court and its predecessors were created by laws promulgated by the Allied
High Commission and the United States High Commission. Id. at 236-37. The United States
Court for Berlin is an "instrumentality" of the United States and falls within the province of the
United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States Department of State. Id. at 237. Because it is a creature of presidential power, it is an article II court
and not an article III court. Id. The United States Court for Berlin shares concurrent criminal
jurisdiction with Berlin courts in the American sector of Berlin, "except to the extent that the
American Sector Commandant withdraws jurisdiction from the German courts in a given case."
Id. Tiede was the first case heard by the United States Court for Berlin, which was established
in 1955. Id. at 237.
In terms of the scope of judicial review, the court rejected that it "[was] not an independent tribunal established to adjudicate the rights of the defendants and lack[ed] the power to
make a ruling contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States." Id. at 239-42. Judge
Stern further declared that the court, not the United States Secretary of State, was the sole
determinator of what rights should be afforded to defendants in the United States Court for
Berlin. Id. at 241-42. Thus, it was held that the United States Constitution was the sole guide-
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cial notice that the occupation of "Berlin in 1979 is unique in the
annals of international relations; 8 the occupation was characterized
as protective in nature. 4 The court did not assess whether Berlin
was an unincorporated or an incorporated territory of the United
States."'
In re Ross 8 served as the court's starting point for its inquiry as
to the scope of extraterritorial application of American law.8 7 After
citing Ross for the proposition that the guarantees of the United
States Constitution have no effect outside its home boundaries,"
Judge Stern quickly pointed out that Ross "was for all practical purposes repudiated. " 89
The court classified the subsequent cases addressing the Ross
issue into two categories: first, those cases where United States control of an area was utilized as the jurisdictional basis for the Constitution's application, second, those cases where American citizenship
served as the jurisdictional basis for the Constitution's application.'
The court found the Insular Cases and their progeny representative of the first line of decisions.'
Acknowledging that the Insular
Cases had only created disparity in this area of the law," the court
noted that it was not until Dorr v. United States that "reasonable
consistency and unanimity of opinion" was reached by the Supreme
Court.
In Dorr the Supreme Court determined that only fundamental rights applied to unincorporated territories; the rights to
indictment by grand jury and trial by jury were found not to be fundamental rights.4 Judge Stern then turned to Balzac v. Porto Rico,
the last case in the category pertaining to an American controlled
post for the court and not the foreign policy concerns of the United States. Id. The Constitution
was deemed to not only have provided the impetus for the court's actions but also to have
dictated the actions of any "United States authorit[y] [which] exercised governmental powers in
any geographical area-whether at war or in times of peace." Id. at 242. See Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866). If the American authorities were not governed by the Constitution, the court feared the possibility of "untrammeled discretion." 86 F.R.D. at 242-43,
243 n.68.
& 86 F.R.D. at 245.
8 Id. at 245-46, 256.
See id. at 249.
140 U.S. 453 (1891).
, 86 F.R.D. at 247. See notes 16-23 supra and accompanying text for a detailed discussion
of Ross.
1 86 F.R.D. at 247.
89

Id.

90 Id.
91 Id.

9 Id. at 247-48.
9 Id. at 248. See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra.
1 86 F.R.D. at 248. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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area, 9 assessing its holding to be an affirmation of the Dorr
proposition.96 Summarizing the Insular Cases as both mandating
constitutional protections for incorporated territories and implying
97
that only fundamental rights applied to unincorporated territories,
the court distinguished these decisions from the situation presented
in Tiede. The Insular Cases were interpreted as addressing the issue
of which constitutional protections benefitted an accused "in a territory administered . . . by the United States . . ., regardless of'
whether the United States itself was the prosecuting authority." f8
Using Balzac as an example, Judge Stern pointed out that the defendant was tried in a local Puerto Rican court.9" Therefore, the Insular
Cases would be relevant only if the defendants were subjected to the
jurisdiction of a German court presiding in the American zone of
Berlin."° In contrast, Tiede involved an American court sitting in the
American sector of Berlin."°' Accordingly, the court concluded that
the Insular Cases were of no precedential value.' 2
Even if the Insular Cases were relevant to Tiede, the court
observed that their viability was questionable as a result of the decision involving American citizenship as a basis for the extraterritorial
application of the United States Constitution. 1" In Reid v. Covert,"'
the Supreme Court considered the right to trial by jury in United
States military tribunals in foreign countries to criminal defendants
who were civilian dependents to American servicemen. "" The Reid
court, reasoning that "the Constitution follows the Flag," concluded
that such defendants could not be court martialed but must be tried
in conformity with the United States Constitution.""6 Finding this
logic to be "irrefutable," the Tiede court concluded that the Constitution applies abroad.0 , The court then noted that the holdings in the
Insular Cases-that trial by jury was not a fundamental right-had
been "authoritatively voided" " by the United States Supreme Court
1

86 F.R.D. at 249.

11Id.

9' Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
9,Id.
100id.
101Id.
10
1-3

Id.
Id.

l 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
'
86 F.R.D. at 249-50. See text accompanying notes 50-59 supra.
eo 86 F.R.D. at 250.
1

Id.

"o Id. at 252.
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decision in Duncan v. Louisiana." Duncan held the right to trial by
jury to be " 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice"' when
an accused is charged with a serious crime. "1 Regarding the conjunction of the holdings in Reid and Duncan to be dispositive of the
issue presented in Tiede, Judge Stern concluded "that, absent the
most extraordinary circumstances, the rights accorded defendants
tried in American courts abroad should not differ from those accorded
defendants tried in American courts in the United States.""' Thus,
the defendants' demand for a jury trial was granted."2 Judge Stern
then directed the clerk of the court to summon "500 veniremen
drawn from a cross-section of the German population of the United
States Sector of Berlin" and stated that if the United States authorities failed to comply with the directive, the "charges lodged against
these defendants [would] be dismissed." 113
In the interim between the granting of the jury trial and the
direction to the clerk of the court to summon the jury panel, an additional determination was made which was reflected in the transcript
of the proceedings but not in the published opinion. "4 The court
analyzed whether the citizens of Berlin would be competent to serve
on an American-styled jury." 3 Judge Stern looked to the Nicholson,
Ikeda and King cases for guidance on this issue." 6 In Nicholson and
Ikeda the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
determined that a trial by jury was constitutionally required in Okinawa, an area occupied by United States authorities after World War
II. " The Tiede court paralleled the circumstances in Okinawa with
those existing in Berlin."' In both instances occupation courts were
asserting jurisdiction over "an area which had been under the authority of an enemy in war, which had been defeated." 11"
Judge Stern then turned to the American Samoan cases of King
The court recognized
v. Morton and its successor, King v. Andrus.'
that the King cases "may not be exactly on point" since an occupation

10

391 U.S. 145 (1968).
86 F.R.D. at 252 (emphasis in Tiede) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149

(1968)).
"1 86 F.R.D. at 252.
"2 See id.
"3 Id. at 261.
See Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript, supra note 10, at 239-46A.
"i

Id.

.. Id. at 239-43.
17 See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
" Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript, supra note 10, at 241.
"I

Id.
Ild. at 241-42.
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court was not involved there."2 ' Furthermore, Judge Stern noted
that a jury was "required as a matter of constitutional law . . . on a
Balzac type analogy." "z However, the Tiede court observed that an
evidentiary hearing was held in King v. Andrus to aid the court in its
determination as to whether American Samoans "weren't fit and competent to be jurors."'
The court in Tiede noted that "[o]ne unifying principle emerges
from the Okinawa cases, the American Samoan cases and .. . the
Berlin case. In each instance the prosecution argued that a trial by
jury should not be granted because the local populace was incompetent to man the jury." 124
After reviewing treatises, law review articles and a study addressing the German judicial system, the court observed "that the
jury system, as we know it in the United States, is not foreign to the
traditions and culture of Germany . . . [though] they decided to dispense with it in 1925." '" Judge Stern stated that "[u]nder the circumstances as they exist today . . . the availability of a jury, the
traditions of jury trials within this area, [and] the fact that there is
something close to . .. citizen participation in the administration of
justice [in Germany] today," the people of Berlin could serve as
jurors in the United States court for Berlin. 16 Therefore, the court
concluded that "it [could not] be said that it would either be impossible or impractical or anomalous under our Constitution to convene a
jury." 127

Although Judge Stern declared the Insular Cases to be "inapposite" to Tiede, 2 1 he relied on King, an extension of the Insular Cases
and the Balzac line of decisions, as support in assessing the feasibility
of implementing the right to trial by jury. While the Insular Cases
and their litany were declared to be questionable in terms of their
"I Id.
'1

at 241.

Id. at 241-42.

Id. at 242.
Id.
'
Id. at 243, 245. In contemporary German trials, where an accused is charged with a
serious crime, "lay judges sit side by side with professional judges." Casper & Zeisel, Lay
Judges in the German Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 140-41 (1972). See generally J. LANCHEIM,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977). The defendants in Tiede would have
been entitled, therefore, to lay participation in their German trial if the United States had not
withdrawn the case from the local jurisdiction.
" Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript, supra note 10, at 245-46. It bears mention that a jury
composed of twelve West Berlin citizens' convicted Tiede of taking a hostage and acquitted him
on the remaining charges. Trial Transcript, supra note 1, at 2937-38.
121 Pre-trial Proceedings Transcript, supra note 10, at 239. See text accompanying notes 60-62
supra.
l2 86 F.R.D. at 249.
'2

'
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viability," Tiede took into account an underlying concern that arose
in some of those decisions: whether a foreign populace which follows
dissimilar customs and jurisprudential standards can render a just and
proper verdict in an American-styled proceeding. 3 ' As a result, this
line of cases can neither be totally ignored nor lightly dismissed.
Tiede is the culmination of a steady progression of decisions
which have applied constitutionally guaranteed procedural protections
to judicial proceedings abroad. The original concept of hinging those
rights upon a "controlled area" theory has apparently been
abandoned, 3' and the focus of inquiry has been shifted to a liberal
construction of explicit constitutional language.'32 It is reasonable to
conclude that the Insular Cases were not binding in this particular
instance in determining whether the defendants were entitled to trial
by jury in the United States Court for Berlin. Berlin is neither an
incorporated nor unincorporated territory of the United States; it is
not even an area ceded to the United States pursuant to a treaty."'
Instead, it is a city occupied for its own defense by its allies.'
For if
Berlin was perceived to be a "controlled area" within the context of
the Insular Cases, a difficult dilemma would be presented. Under a
"controlled area" theory the local German courts situated
in the
American sector of Berlin would be required to administer justice,
with all its fundamental necessities, in the American tradition." An
American court would be hard-pressed to justify the imposition of
such a procedural system upon a functioning and capable foreign local
judiciary.

12

Id.

"3 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1922); Dorr v. U.S., 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904);
King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
For a discussion of the Insular Cases by the Tiede court, see text accompanying notes
91-102 supra. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
86 F.R.D. at 259. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution states in pertinent
part:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Furthermore, the sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
'
See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 82-84 supra and accompanying text.
Z
See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 43-47 & 94-101
supra.
13'

13'
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In Tiede a workable and realistic approach was achieved by relying upon case law which mandates that American citizenship provides the rationale for the extraterritorial extension of the right to
trial by jury. Tiede seized upon this doctrine and expanded its reach
to any person who is brought before an American tribunal, absent
"extraordinary circumstances.""
The right to trial by jury, as contained in the sixth amendment of
the United States Constitution, is an integral aspect of the American
concept of justice -wherever it may be administered. Historically, it
has been regarded as a buffer which is strategically placed between
an accused and a "corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and . . . [a] compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." " The elimination of such a fun-

" 86 F.R.D. at 252. The only component that would interfere with such a conclusion would
be the presentation of "the most extraordinary circumstances." Id. Judge Stern found no extraordinary circumstances to exist in Tiede. Id.
Among those elements which would constitute extraordinary circumstances would be the
prosecution of defendants who were "enemy nationals, enemy belligerents or prisoners of war."
Id. at 244-45, 252-53. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Homma v. Patterson,
327 U.S. 759 (1946); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). The prosecution's position was that the
defendants in Tiede were aliens and therefore could not be beneficiaries of a jury trial since
prior judicial proceedings in occupation courts only spoke to the rights of American citizens. 86
F.R.D. at 259. The court deemed this argument to be without merit, finding that these "friendly"
aliens were protected by the explicit language contained in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution, as well as by international agreement. Id. at 259-60. See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Regarding the Application of the Constitution of the
United States to These Proceedings, at 21-22, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for Berlin 1979)
[hereinafter Memorandum in Opposition].
The quality of the crime, e.g., a war crime, can also be considered as an exception to
Judge Stem's general rule. 86 F.R.D. at 244-45. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Finally, the nature of a military tribunal which presides "in wartime or during the belligerent occupation of enemy territory before the termination of war" is a factor that is capable of
creating an extraordinary circumstance. 86 F.R.D. at 244-45. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S.
341 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Tiede court rejected the prosecution's
sweeping contention that an accused could not be adjudged by a jury in a military commission
setting, finding that the cases proffered did not support such a conclusion. 86 F. R. D. at 253-56.
See Memorandum in Opposition, supra, at 18-21. Quirin was distinguishable in that it looked at
the type of crime the defendants were charged with and not the character of a military commission. 86 F.R.D. at 253-54. Madsen, on the other hand, never reached the issue of whether
Mrs. Madsen was entitled to a trial by jury in a military tribunal. Id. at 254-55. To the contrary, Mrs. Madsen claimed "that she should have been tried by a general court-martial." Id. at
255. Additionally, Judge Stern noted that Madsen was decided prior to Duncan and, at the time
of the Madsen trial, the United States was still technically at war with Germany. Id. at 255-56.
In support of the conclusion that civil occupation courts by nature do not proscribe trial by jury,
Tiede cited Nicholson v. McNamara and Ikeda v. McNamara. Id. at 256-59. For discussion of
these cases, see text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
"3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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damental right should only occur under the most compelling and exigent conditions, involving the gravest consequences. Tiede is
meaningful in that it appreciates the essence of this basic right and
warmly embraces it.

Lynn D. Healy

